Inflation and Growth: Impatience and a Qualitative Equivalence by Been-Lon Chen et al.
中央研究院經濟所學術研討論文 
IEAS Working Paper 
 
 
Inflation and Growth: Impatience and a Qualitative 
Equivalence 
Been-Lon Chen, Mei Hsu and Chia-Hui Lu 





Institute of Economics 
Academia Sinica 






中央研究院  經濟研究所 
INSTITUTE OF ECONOMICS, ACADEMIA SINICA 
TAIWAN 
copyright © 2007 (Been-Lon Chen, Mei Hsu and Chia-Hui Lu)  





Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica 
Mei Hsu 
Department of Economics, National Taipei University 
Chia-Hui Lu 





This paper studies the role of an endogenous time preference on the relationship between 
inflation and growth in the long run in both the money-in-utility-function (MIUF) and transaction 
costs (TC) models.  We establish a qualitative equivalence between the two models in a setup 
without a labor-leisure tradeoff.  When the time preference is decreasing (or increasing) in 
consumption and real balances, both the MIUF and TC models are qualitatively equivalent in 
terms of predicting a negative (or positive) relationship between inflation and growth in a steady 
state.  Both a decreasing and an increasing time preference in consumption are consistent with the 
arguments in the literature.  While a decreasing time preference in real balances corroborates with 
empirical evidence, there is no evidence in support of an increasing time preference in real 
balances.  
 
JEL classification:  O42. 











* We have benefited from discussions with Ping Wang in an earlier version.  
** Corresponding address:  Been-Lon Chen, the Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica, 128 
Academia Rd., Section 2, Taipei 11529, TAIWAN.  Phone:  (886-2)27822791 ext. 309; Fax:  
(886-2)27853946; Email:  bchen@econ.sinica.edu.tw 
 
   1
1.  Introduction 
    The relation between inflation and growth has been one of the central issues in 
macroeconomic literature since the work by Tobin (1965) and Sidrauski (1967a, b).  It is well-
known that alternative approaches of introducing money yield incompatible predictions 
concerning the effect of anticipated inflation on capital accumulation.  These competing 
approaches include the money-in-utility-function (MIUF) model, the transactions-costs (TC) 
approach and the cash-in-advance (CIA) approach.
1   A comparison of the MIUF and TC 
approaches was given by Dornbush and Frenkel (1973), and the equivalence of the MIUF and TC 
approaches was first indicated by an example in Brock (1974).
2  Feenstra (1986) established 
functional equivalence between the MIUF and TC approaches.
3  Since then, numerous theoretical 
developments in comparisons of these competing approaches have been achieved.   
Among these, there are two successful advancements that established a qualitative 
equivalence between alternative approaches.  The first is Wang and Yip (1992).  Different from 
Feenstra, Wang and Yip (1992) used the utility employed in Brock (1974) that allowed for direct 
utility interactions between leisure and real balances.  A qualitative equivalence was created when 
higher monetary growth leads to lower capital and higher leisure in a steady state.  The required 
conditions were weaker than those necessary for a functional equivalence.  Next, Zhang (2000) 
also obtained a qualitative equivalence between inflation and growth, but unlike Wang and Yip 
(1992), the equivalence was among different cases in the TC approach.  With labor-leisure 
tradeoffs, Zhang (2000) considered a general TC function and assumed that money holdings 
reduce the transaction costs of consumption, production or investment.  He obtained comparative-
static results similar to Wang and Yip (1992) when assuming a dominant consumption effect. 
These existing studies represented preferences with labor-leisure tradeoffs and a functional 
in which a utility function is discounted by a constant rate of time preference.  The specification 
is attractive because it is analytically tractable and easily describes how tastes and opportunities 
interact to determine an economy’s paths of consumption and capital accumulation.  However, its 
rigid structure severely limits the conclusions and explanatory power of the corresponding models.  
                                                 
1 While Tobin (1965) used the TC approach in a non-optimized model and obtained a positive relationship 
between inflation and growth as a result of portfolio shift from non-interest bearing real balances to capital, 
Sidrauski (1967a, b) employed the MIUF approach with individuals’ rational choices in an infinite horizon 
model and found growth independent of money growth or inflation, known as the super-neutrality of money.   
 
2 Dornbush and Frenkel (1973) used a non-optimized model with inelastic labor, whereas Brock (1974) 
employed an individual optimized, infinite-horizon model with leisure and thus, elastic labor. 
 
3  In a model without capital and labor-leisure choice, Feenstra showed a duality between the two 
approaches by redefining choice variables, but he required unpopular utility specifications.   2
Their preference implies the marginal rate of substitution between time t1 and t2 is independent of 
consumption at any time t≠ t1, t2.  As a result, when a labor-leisure tradeoff is not possible, this 
kind of model implies the neutrality of money in the long run.  This paper considers a generalized 
class of preferences which has an attractive feature in which the rate of time preference is 
endogenous.  This class of preferences allows the demands of consumption and real balances at 
any time t≥t1 to affect the marginal rate of substitution between time t1 and t2>t1.  Thus, if there is 
a shock affecting consumption and real balances now, the marginal rate of substitution between 
now and future is influenced.  As a result, even if a labor-leisure tradeoff is not possible, capital 
accumulation and growth may be changed.  In this paper, we study the economic implications on 
the relationship between inflation and growth in the long run when a class of preference with an 
endogenous time preference is considered.  
Specifically, in the present model, we study the non superneutrality of money in an 
otherwise standard optimal growth model.  The departure here is to take account of an 
endogenous time preference.  Labor supply is perfectly inelastic as is usually assumed in optimal 
growth models.  We choose the setup of inelastic labor not because it is more realistic.  Rather, 
existing studies by Brock (1974) and Wang and Yip (1992) have relied on elastic labor in order to 
establish non superneutrality.
4   Our setup highlights the significance of an endogenous time 
preference in establishing the non superneutrality result without relying on leisure-labor tradeoffs.   
An endogenous time preference has been stressed at least as early as Böhm-Bawerk (1989).  
Fisher (1930, pp61-94) has observed the changes in the rate of time preference, or the degree of 
impatience, over time as consumption, income, risks and personal factors change.  Koopmans 
(1960) has elaborated an endogenous time preference in a model class with a recursive utility.  In 
a neoclassical growth framework, endogenous impatience was first formalized by Uzawa (1968), 
followed by Wan (1970).  Endogenous impatience has since then been extensively used in 
optimal growth models (e.g., Lucas and Stokey, 1984; Epstein, 1987a; Obstfeld, 1990), 
endogenous growth models (e.g., Palivos et al, 1997) and growth models with open economies 
(e.g., Devereux and Shi, 1991).
5       
In a standard optimal growth model, steady-state capital is determined by the commodity 
market clearance condition and the Keynes-Ramsey rule.  In both the MIUF and TC models a 
higher rate of monetary expansion reduces real balances because of higher inflation and thus, a 
                                                 
4  Another way to obtain non-neutrality in the long run independent of labor-leisure tradeoffs is to introduce 
to wealth in utility as performed by Gong and Zuo (2001) and Chang and Tsai (2003), among others.   
 
5  Recently, Becker and Mulligan (1997) proposed the hypothesis of endogenously reducing subjective 
discount on the future utilities as a result of consumers’ efforts. 
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higher opportunity cost of holding money.  In our study, the effect of anticipated inflation on real 
balances is transmitted to capital via an endogenous degree of impatience.  It is easy for money to 
become non superneutral in a steady state because of an endogenous response of a time 
preference.  We establish a qualitative equivalence between the MIUF and TC approaches, under 
not only a positive but also a negative relationship between inflation and growth.  The positive 
relationship, a variation on Tobin effect, emerges when the time preference is increasing in both 
consumption and money at the same time, while the negative relationship, a reverse Tobin effect, 
arises when the time preference is decreasing in both consumption and money at the same time.  
As a result, the long-run relationship between inflation and growth depend crucially on the 
response of a time preference to consumption and money.  There is evidence consistent with a 
time preference both decreasing and increasing in consumption.  However, there is only evidence 
in support of a time preference decreasing in real balances, as was partly evidenced by Becker 
and Mulligan (1994).  Under plausible decreasing impatience, we thus establish a qualitative 
equivalence between the MIUF and TC approaches in line with that in Wang and Yip (1992) and 
Zhang (2000).  Different from these two existing studies, our equivalence result relies on neither 
a labor-leisure tradeoff nor a dominant consumption effect.    
Finally, we must mention that this paper is not the first attempt to analyze the implication of 
an endogenous time preference on the non superneutrality.  Earlier, Epstein and Hynes (1983, Sec. 
V) have argued because of the substitutability between real balances and consumption in a MIUF 
model, inflation increases steady-state capital when the time preference is endogenous.  Thus, 
only the Tobin effect is observed in Epstein and Hynes.  Our model renders the result in Epstein 
and Hynes (1983) as a special case only when real balances increase impatience.  We predict a 
negative relationship between inflation and capital when real balances decrease impatience.   
Moreover, we establish a qualitative equivalence between the MIUF and TC models, an 
unaddressed issue in Epstein and Hynes (1983).  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up a MIUF model and 
studies the optimization conditions. Section 3 examines money superneutrality in the MIUF 
economy.  Section 4 studies the TC model and establishes a qualitative equivalence between the 
MIUF and TC models.  Finally, some concluding remarks are made in Section 5. 
 
2.  A MIUF Model 
We consider an extension of the one-sector optimal growth model with infinitely lived 
agents.  The economy consists of a large number of identical agents, normalized to unity, and 
each of them has one unit of labor which is supplied inelastically.  The agent seeks to maximize   4
the following discounted sum of lifetime felicities 
 
0
(() , () ) () Uu c t m t X t d t
∞
=∫ , (1) 
in which u is the felicity function, c and m are individual consumption and real balances, and X is 
the cumulative discount at timet .  Following Sidrauski (1967a, b), money directly enters the 
felicity, on the argument that this represents a reduced form equation in a world of transaction 
costs.  By facilitating transactions, money yields a direct utility to the agent that is not associated 
with other assets such as capital, which then further yields an indirect utility through the income 
they generate and the consumption goods they enable the agent to purchase. 
The cumulative discount is endogenous, and is 
0
() e x p [ (() , () ) ]
t
X tc m d ρ ττ τ ≡− ∫ , where ρ(·, 
·) is the discounting function, or the degree of impatience.   This relation is equivalent to   
  (() , () ) () X ct mt Xt ρ =− & , with X(0) given,  (2) 
Assumption 1.  (i)  (, ) 0 (, ) ,  (, ) 0 (, ) , cc c mm m u c mu c m u c mu c m >> >>  for any c>0 and m>0;   




ρ −<   for any c>0 and m>0. 
The assumption in (i) postulates a positive and decreasing marginal utility of consumption; 
the same assumption is made for real balances following existing studies of MIUF models.  The 
assumption in (ii) requires the curvature of felicity with respect to consumption larger than that of 
discount rate with respect to consumption.  This assumption is necessary in order to assure a 
positive intertemporal elasticity of substitution.   Unlike Asako (1983) who assumed the utility is 
separable and Hayakawa (1995) who assumed the perfect complementarity of consumption and 
real balances so ucm(c, m)=umc(c, m)=0, we allow for the substitutability between consumption and 
real balances without imposing restrictions on ucm(c, m) and umc(c, m).  
A correlation between consumption and time preferences is well postulated.  There is, 
however, a considerable disagreement over whether impatience should increase or decrease as 
actual consumption rises.  Fisher (1930) proposed that a person’s impatience decreases as the 
economy develops.  Koopmans (1960) made arguments in favor of decreasing impatience.   
Authors like Blanchard and Fischer (1989) and Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) find 
counterintuitive that people would be more impatient as their level of consumption rises.  On the 
other hand, Epstein (1987a, pp73-74), who surveys the debates on this issue, offers several 
counter-arguments and argues that the proper interpretation of a discount rate is that individuals 
who know that will have a large level of consumption in the future evaluate current consumption 
more highly.  Lucas and Stokey (1984) point out that increasing impatience, a type of diminishing 
returns to savings, is often needed to produce unique, stable and non-degenerate steady-state   5
wealth distributions in a deterministic infinite-horizon setting with a fixed set of agents.  Authors 
like Obstfeld (1990) and Palivos, et al. (1997) follow the assumption of increasing impatience in 
order to assure the stability.  In this paper, we allow for the possibilities of both ρc>0 and ρc<0.  
Empirical evidence is also mixed in support of either one of the two relationships.
6 
The correlation between real cash holdings and time preference is justified as follows.  In 
the formulation with consumption and money in utility, the rate of time preference at time t is the 
Volterra derivative of the present value (in utility terms) due to an upward perturbation of the 
consumption path at time equal and larger than t, according to Epstein and Hynes (1983) and 
Epstein (1987b).  Applying this method, Obstfeld (1990) showed that the rate of time preference 
depends on consumption and the shadow price, or the co-state variable, of the cumulated discount.  
The shadow price of the cumulated discount at time t represents the discounted present value of 
the future felicities at and after time t.  When both consumption and money appear in the felicity 
function, both arguments are in relation to the rate of time preference through the shadow price of 
the cumulated discount.  As a result, money is in relation to time preferences.  While there is little 
evidence about a relation between money and time preferences, Becker and Mulligan (1994) have 
used data in the Panel Study of Income Dynamics and uncovered a positive relationship between 
wealth and patience.
7  As money accounts for a fraction of wealth, their result may be viewed as 
supportive of the negative relationship between money and time preferences, namely ρm<0.  
Although such a relation is what will be focused on, in the analysis that follows we do not rule 
out the possibility of a positive relationship between money and impatience, exemplified by ρm>0.        
The agent owns the shares of firms.  The representative firm is endowed with a technology 
y=f(k), where y is per-capita output and k is per-capita capital stock, with k(0) given initially, and, 
for simplicity, is assumed not to depreciate.   
Assumption 2.  (i)
0
( ) 0 ( ),  (0) 0, lim ( ) 0 , and lim ( ) kk k k k
kk
fk f kf fk fk
→∞ →
>> = = = ∞ ; 




c f ρ <  for all k and c.  
                                                 
6 Evidence on the relationship between time preferences and consumption is based on either cross-sectional 
or time-series data.  Hong (1988) proposed trade is likely to decrease the rate of time preference of a 
developing country.  He uses a cross section of 42 developing countries and found evidence that supports 
his argument.  Using household cross-section data based upon the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, 
Lawrence (1991) uncovered the time preference rate of the poor is three to five percentage points higher 
than those of the rich.  Using the post-war annual time-series data from Japan and Taiwan, Ogawa (1993) 
found the time preference rates were declining up to a certain point and then increasing as the two 
economies grew.  See also evidence cited in Becker and Mulligan (1997) concerning the hypothesis that (a) 
patience varies across individuals and (b) wealth causes patience. 
 
7 See also Becker and Mulligan (1997) that contains an extensive overview of the empirical studies on the 
connection between wealth and time preferences.   6
While the assumption of a positive and concave technology with the Inada conditions in (i) 
is standard in a neoclassical production function, (ii) is a technical condition that requires the 
technology be more concave than the instantaneous discount.  This latter condition is necessary in 
order to satisfy the Correspondence Principle (Samuelson, 1948).
8   
Nominal money supply is assumed to grow at a constant rate µ with the amount of nominal 
money supply given initially.  The real transfer from the government, ν, is financed by 
seigniorage, so ν=µm.  Unspent real disposable income accumulates wealth.  The budget 
constraint of the representative agent is thus 
                                                         ( ) af k m c π ν = −+ − & ,                                                          (3) 
where a=k+m is the agent’s total wealth and π is the rate of inflation. 
The representative agent’s optimal program is to maximize (1), subject to (2) and (3) and 
the wealth constraint.  The necessary conditions are  
                         ( , ) ( , ), cc uc m c m θ λρ = −                                                     (4a) 
                             ( ) , k fk θ ξ =                                                             (4b) 
                     ( , ) ( , ) , mm uc m c m λρθ π ξ − =+                                           (4c) 
                        
.
(, ) (, ) ucm cm λλ ρ =− + ,                                                (4d) 
                            ( , ) cm θ ρθ ξ = − & ,                                                        (4e) 








=  where  θ>0 
which is the co-state variable associated with total wealth, -λ>0 is the co-state variable associated 
with the impatience, and ξ>0 is the Lagrange multiplier associated with wealth. 
While (4a) equates the marginal cost to the marginal utility of consumption, (4b) and (4c) 
require the marginal product of capital and the discounted marginal utility of real balances equal 
the shadow price of capital and real balances.  Finally, (4d) and (4e) are the Euler equations 
governing the changes in the shadow price of the cumulative discount and capital.   Note that 
compared to the standard optimal one-sector growth model, there are two differences here.  The 
first difference is in (4a) and (4c) where time preferences change with respect to consumption and 
real balances and affect the marginal utility of consumption and real balances.  Moreover, as the 
individual cumulative discount changes, its shadow price changes over time in (4d), in contrast to 
a set up without the shadow price of a social cumulative discount (e.g., Meng, 2006).    
In equilibrium, both the money and the goods markets must be clear.  That is,  
                                                 
8 The condition is thus a variant of the Brock-Gale condition that requires the increase in the discount rate 
to dominate the increase in the marginal product of capital in the steady-state equilibrium.       
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() , mm µ π = − &                                                         (5a)  
() kf kc = − & .                                                         (5b) 
  A Perfect Foresight Equilibrium (PFE) is a time path {c, m, k, λ, θ, ξ, π} that satisfies 
optimization conditions (4a)-(4e) and the money and commodity market equilibrium, (5a) and 
(5b).  We may derive the dynamic equilibrium system as follows.  Using (4a)-(4c), the money 
market equilibrium condition is rewritten as 
                                             ( )
(, ) (, )
(, ) (, ) () .
mm
cc
uc m c m




− =− + &                                               (6a) 
Moreover, total differentiation of (4a) yields  
() ( ) , cc cc cm cm c uc u m λρλ ρ ρ λ θ −+ − − = && &&  
and substituting into (4d)-(4e) and (6a) along with the use of (4a)-(4c) leads to 
( )




k c c c cm cm k u u cf u u u f m
λρ
λρ λρ ρ λρ ρ λρ λρ µ
− −
− − =− − − − + − − + &        (6b) 
in which  1
cc cc u λρ
−
−  is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution and Assumption 1.2 assures the 
intertemporal elasticity is positive in a steady state where λ=u/ρ.  
  Finally, both the Euler equation for the cumulative discount and the goods market clearance 
are in (4d) and (5b).  Thus, the system is reduced to four dynamic equations, (4d), (5b), (6a) and 
(6b).  These four equations determine the time path of c, m, k and λ.  The time path of the shadow 
prices θ, ξ and π are in turn determined by (4a)-(4c). 
 
3.  A Steady State in a MIUF Economy 
A steady state is a PFE when  0. cmkλθ = ==== &&& &&
9  In a steady state, while (5a) indicates 
π
* =µ, we may simplify the conditions in (4b), (4d)-(4e), (5b) and (6a)-(6b) as follows.
10 
** * () (, ) , k f kc m ρ =                                                        (7a) 
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** ** * * * * (, ) [(, ) (, ) ] . cc cm ucm cm ξρ λ ρ =−                                      (7e)                   
Equations (7a), (7b) and (7d) determine the values for {c
*, k
*, m
*} in a steady state.  Then, 
                                                 
9 An asterisk is used to denote a steady-state value.   
 
10 While these equations are easily obtained, in deriving (7d) equations (4a)-(4c), (5a) and (7c) are used.    8
we use (7c) to determine λ
* and, finally, (7e) to determine ξ
*.   
We are ready to analyze the relationship between money and growth in the long run.  This 
involves a comparative-static exercise around a steady state about the effect of a higher growth 
rate of monetary expansion, i.e., a higher µ.  A meaningful comparative-static exercise requires 
that the steady state be a stable saddle.  In the Appendix, we take a linear Taylor expansion of 




*}.  A negative determinant of the 
Jacobean matrix of the linear system is required in order to guarantee saddle stability.  Denote by 
∆ the determinant of the Jacobean matrix.  Then, the condition corresponds to ∆<0.  Under the 
saddle stability condition, the equilibrium time path around the steady state is locally determinate.  
To investigate the relationship between money and growth in the long run, we start with the 
special case when real balances do not affect the degree of impatience, followed by the general 
case when real balances affect the degree of impatience.   
  Consider the special case when real balances do not affect the degree of impatience, ρm=0.  
Then, the steady-state Keynes-Ramsey rule (7a), for convenience referred to as the KR rule, and 
the steady-state commodity market clearance condition (7b), referred as the CC condition, 
simultaneously determine the unique level of capital and consumption.  Specifically, while the 
steady-state CC condition is positively sloping in the (k, c) plan, the steady-state KR rule may be 
negative or positive sloping depending on ρc≥0 and ρc≤0 (Figures 1 and 2).  Under ρc≤0, the 
steady-state KR rule must be steeper than the CC condition in the (k, c) plan in order to satisfy the 
Samuelson Correspondence Principle.
11  The relative slopes of the two loci imply the requirement 
of 0 kk c f ρ ρ −<  in Assumption 2.2.  Thus, under 0, kk c f ρ ρ − <  there exists a unique steady state.  
[Insert Figures 1 and 2] 
In both conditions of ρc≥0 and ρc≤0, the steady-state levels of consumption and capital are 
completely determined by these two conditions in (7a) and (7b) independent real balances (E0 in 
Figures 1 and 2).  Then, the growth rate of nominal money, µ, exerts effects on real balances 
completely determined by (7d).  In this economy, nominal money is thus superneutral in the long 
run even though real balances interact in a utility term with consumption and consumption affects 
time preferences.  Indeed, as we have shown in the Appendix, this special superneutrality feature 
is shared with a cash-in-advance constraint on consumption.   
Next, consider the general case when real balances affect the degree of impatience, i.e., 
ρm≠0.  In this case, it may be ρm>0 and ρm<0.  The growth rate of money affects real balances, and 
                                                 
11  Under ρc≤0, should the steady-state KR rule be flatter than the CC condition, then a lower productivity 
shock would have led to an increase, rather than a decrease, in both capital and consumption in steady state.  
       9
via the effect on impatience affects consumption and capital.   
To specifically understand the effects, first, if we differentiate (7a) and (7b), we obtain 
() . kk c m f dk dm ρ ρρ − =                                                   (8a) 
where 0 kk c f ρ ρ −<  according to Assumption 2.  
  Next, differentiating (7d), together (7b), yields
12 
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  Together (8a) and (8b), we obtain 
()
0,







                                                (9a) 
where  1 () 0 cc cc m u θρ λρ Λ=− ∆ − < as  0
cc
cc cc cc uu u
ρ
ρ λρ − =− <   under Assumption 1 and ∆<0 
when the steady state is a saddle.   
  It follows from (9a) that an increase in the growth rate of money unambiguously reduces 
the holdings of real balances.  A lower level of real balances then affects the holding of capital 
and consumption in a steady state through (8a) and (7b). 
  Substituting (9a) into (8a) yields 












                                (9b) 
The effect on capital thus depends on how real balances affect the degree of impatience.  
When the degree of impatience is increasing in real balances, capital holdings are higher in a 
steady state (point A in Figures 1 and 2).  This is the Tobin effect, a result predicted by Epstein 
and Hynes (1983) in the case with an endogenous time preference.  Alternatively, if the degree of 
impatience is decreasing in real balances, capital holdings are lower in a steady state (point B 
Figures 1 and 2). 
Similarly, if we substitute (9b) into (7b), a higher growth rate of money affects the steady-
state consumption in the same direction as that of capital, 
()
{} .








                                          (9c) 
                                                 
12  See Appendix for derivation of (8b).   10
  Intuitively, a higher growth rate of money leads to lower real balances.  If the degree of 
impatience is increasing in real balances, an individual is more patient as he has less real balances.  
The representative agent tends to consume less and saves more.  It follows that capital stock is 
higher in a steady state.  As a result, output and consumption are higher in a steady state.   
Alternatively, if the degree of impatience is decreasing in real balances, an individual becomes 
less patient as real balances decrease.  The representative agent then consumes more and saves 
less at that time.  Consequently, capital stock, output and consumption are lower in a steady state.  
Using (9a) and (9b), the change in wealth in the long run is 
  
[( ) ]
0  if   ( ) 0.
kk c m
mk k c









               (10a) 
If lower real balances make the agent more impatient, real balances and capital both are 
lower in a steady state.  As a result, wealth decreases in a steady state.  However, if ρm>0 and is 
sufficiently large, lower real balances make the agent more patient and he thus saves so much that 
the increase in capital is larger than the decrease in real balances.  In this case, wealth is larger in 
a steady state.    







ρ =   A lower level of real balances 
reduces the felicity but may decrease or increase the discount rate, so the welfare effect is 
ambiguous.  Moreover, the level of consumption may be higher or lower, making the welfare 
effect even ambiguous.  The net effect on the level of utility is (see Appendix)   
(1 / )( ) 0
() ( 1 ) 0   i f    .
(1 / )( ) 0
ck k m
cc m




µ ρρ ρ ρ µ
λρ ρ
µρ ρ ρ µρ ρ ρ µ
+ −> ≥≥
=− + +
+ −> ≤≤ −
       (10b)                               
Apparently, if ρm<0, the level of welfare must be lower in a steady state because of a lower 
consumption level and a higher discount rate resulting from lower real balances.  Alternatively, if 
ρm>0, the effect on the level of welfare is ambiguous.  In the situation where a positive ρm is 
sufficiently large so the condition in (10b) is met, consumption increases so as to raise welfare 
although lower real balances reduce welfare.  
      
4.  Transaction Costs Model 
In this Section, we turn to the TC model where money is introduced through a shopping 
time technology.  Following Saving (1971) and Wang and Yip (1992), we assume that only 
consumption transactions are costly and money holdings facilitate transactions.  Specifically, the 
transaction costs are assumed to take the form:  T(t)=T(c(t), m(t)), where Tc>0, Tcc>0, Tm<0<Tmm, 
T(0, m)=0 and Tcm≤0.  Thus, we assume the transaction costs are positive if there is positive   11
consumption.  Moreover, the transaction costs function is convex in consumption and decreasing 
in real balances in a diminishing way.  Finally, assumption Tcm ≤0 indicates that higher real 
balances tend to lower the marginal transaction costs of consumption. 
With transaction costs, the representative agent’s budget constraint in (3) now becomes 
                                                       ( ) ( , ). af kc m T c m π ν = −− +− &                                           (11) 
The discounted lifetime utility is given by (1), but the felicity u(c, m) in (1) is replaced by 
u(c) and the discount rate ρ(c, m) in (2) by ρ(c).  The Volterra derivative indicates that ρ is a 
function of c and the shadow price of the cumulative discount.  The shadow price of the 
cumulative discount at time t in turn is the present value of the future discounted felicity at and 
after time t which is a function of c(t).  As a result, we replace ρ(c(t), m(t)) in (2) by ρ(c(t)).         
 In the Appendix, we have derived the representative agent’s optimization problem.  In 
equilibrium, while the money market clearance condition remains (5a), the goods market 
clearance condition in (5b) is modified as  
() (, ) . kf kc T c m =− − &                                                       (12) 
In the Appendix, we have simplified the equilibrium dynamic system into a 4x4 system 
characterized by c, m, k and λ.  The way to determine the equilibrium path of key variables is also 
explained.  We have taken a linear Taylor expansion of the system around a steady state.  In order 
to assure a stable saddle in a steady state, the determinant of the Jacobean matrix of the linear 
system must be negative, denoted by ∆TC<0.   
We are ready to analyze the money superneutrality in a steady state.  In a steady state, 
0 cmkλ == == && && .  The steady-state conditions are 
** () () , k f kc ρ =                                                           (13a) 
    






c ρ λ =                                                              (13c) 
       
* () , km f kT µ += −                                                         (13d) 
  
** * (). c ξ ρθ =                                                            (13e) 
Note that compared the steady-state conditions here with those in the MIUF model, real 
balances affect a steady state via subjective time preferences in (7a), (7c) and (7e) but not in the 
corresponding (13a), (13c) and (13e).  Rather, real balances affect the TC model here through real 
transaction costs in the CC condition (13b) and the optimal demand for real balances in (13d).  
Because of reducing real transaction costs, monetary expansion is usually not superneutral in the   12
TC model in a standard optimal growth model with elastic labor supply and an exogenous time 
preference.  In our TC model with inelastic labor, money affects the KR rule in (13a), and thus 
capital, via the effect of consumption on time preference.  As a result, the relationship between 
inflation and growth may be different.  
To analyze the relationship between inflation and growth, the KR rule (13a) and the CC 
condition (13b) in the (k, c) plan are illustrated in Figures 3 and 4 with the steady state at E0.  
When  ρc≤0, the Correspondence Principle requires fkk(1+Tc)-ρρc<0, which is assured under 





kk TT f dk dm
ρρ ρ
++ −= −                                                 (14a) 
Similar to our MIUF model in Section 3, changes in capital depend on changes in real 
balances, but the effect is now via reducing transaction costs Tm<0.  If the time preference is 
independent of consumption, ρc=0.  Then even if real balances reduce transaction costs, they only 
affect consumption in (13b) without spreading out the effect to (13a), thereby exerting no effect 
on capital.  Capital is solely determined by (13a) in this special case.  As a result, money is 
superneutral in a steady state.  This is the result shared in the TC models in Wang and Yip (1992) 
and Zhang (2000) when their labor supply is inelastic.  However, if consumption affects time 
preferences, then even if labor supply is inelastic, real balances remain exerting effects on capital.  
The effect of a higher growth rate of money on real balances is obtained by differentiating 
(13d), with the use of (14a) and (13b),   
      
* (1 )













                                   (14b) 
as 








− Ω≡ − <  and ∆TC<0.     
It is clear that real balances are decreasing in the growth rate of nominal money supply 
even if ρc=0.  As real balances decrease, the CC condition shifts downward (Figures 3 and 4).  
Obviously, even if ρc=0, consumption unambiguously decreases in a steady state because of 
higher transaction costs due to lower real balances.  However, the effect on capital depends upon 
how the degree of impatience responds to lower consumption.  In Figure 3 where ρc≥0, it is clear 
that capital increases.  In contrast, in Figure 4 where ρc≤0, capital decreases.  
 
[Insert Figures 3 and 4 here] 
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                             (14d) 
Intuitively, lower real balances increase the transaction costs of consumption and thus 
discourage consumption.  In an economy where an agent is less patient as he consumes more, 
ρc>0, lower consumption makes him more patient so he saves more.  As a result, capital is higher 
in a steady state.  Alternatively, when an individual is more patient as he consumes more, ρc>0, 
lower consumption makes him less patient.  Consequently, capital is lower in a steady state.    
Using (14b) and (14c), the change in wealth in a steady state is 
      
* (1 )
[( 1 ) ( ) ]0 ( 1 ) 0 .
c
kk c c m c m kk c c
TC
mT da
fT T i f T fT
d
ρ
ρρ ρ ρ ρ
µ
≥≤ +
== + − + + − <
≤≥ ∆Ω
      (15a) 
The wealth may decrease or increase as a result of a higher growth rate of money.  In the 
case where ρc≤0, as then ρcTm>0, real balances and capital both decrease and thus the amount of 
wealth decreases (Figure 4).  Alternatively, in the case where ρc≥0, as ρcTm <0, the effect on 
wealth is ambiguous because real balances decrease while capital increases (Figure 3).  In this 
case it is possible that wealth then increases in a steady state.  This situation emerges when 
ρc>fkk(1+Tc)/(ρ+Tm)>0.
13  Under such a condition, the agent becomes sufficiently patient so an 
increase in capital is more than a decrease in real balances.   
Finally, the effect on the lifetime utility in a steady state is negative (See Appendix) 
(1 )
0.





= <                                                  (15b) 
Intuitively, even if lower consumption may make people feel less impatient and creates an 
indirect offsetting effect through a possible lower degree of impatience in the case of ρc≥0, the 
direct effect of lower consumption on utilities apparently dominates.  As a result, the lifetime 
utility is unambiguously lower in a steady state.  
We now briefly compare the MIUF and TC models.  Table 1 conveniently summarizes the 
comparative-static results for the two models with an endogenous time preference.   
It is clear that if a time preference is affected by real balances in the MIUF model, money is 
not superneutral even without labor-leisure tradeoffs.  The non-superneutrality result here is in 
line with Brock (1974) and his followers in models that rely on labor-leisure tradeoffs to create 
non superneutrality.  The result differs from the superneutrality in Sidrauski (1967a, b) in models 
with an exogenous time preference.  Our results reveal that a higher growth rate of money, and 
thus higher inflation, reduces capital, wealth, consumption and welfare in the long run in the case 
                                                 
13  Notice (ρ+Tm)<0 as ρc(ρ+Tm)<fkk(1+Tc)<0 and ρc>0 in this case.     14
where ρm<0, but increases capital and wealth in the case where ρm>0.  The positive relationship 
between inflation and capital in the latter case features a Tobin effect in the sense of Tobin (1965).  
This positive relationship between inflation and capital is what has been argued and emphasized 
by Epstein and Hynes (1983) in the context of an endogenous time preference.  The result in 
Epstein and Hynes (1983), however, is only one of the cases here that emerges only if real 
balances increase impatience.  If real balances decrease impatience, the relationship between 
inflation and capital is negative in a steady state.   Existing empirical evidence is in support of 
this case (Becker and Mulligan, 1994), but Epstein and Hynes (1983) neglected this result.  
 [Insert Table 1 here] 
In the special case where ρm=0, real balances do not affect a time preference.  In this case we 
obtain the money superneutrality even when consumption affects a time preference.  In a MIUF 
model with an endogenous time preference, Hayakawa (1995) obtained the superneutrality only 
when there is a perfect complementarity between real balances and consumption.
14  In contrast, 
provided that a time preference is free from the effect of real balances, our MIUF model obtains 
the superneutrality under a very general utility function that allows for substitutability between 
real balances and consumption.   
For the TC model with an endogenous time preference, results in Table 1 indicate that a 
higher growth rate of money, and thus higher inflation, unambiguously decreases real balances 
and consumption, and thus wealth, because of the transaction costs of consumption.  This result is 
in line with the prediction in existing work with an exogenous time preference by Wang and Yip 
(1992) and Zhang (2000).  Like these existing studies, money supply is not superneutral.   
However, depending on the response of time preferences to consumption, the relationship 
between inflation and capital here may be negative or positive in a steady state.  The relationship 
is negative only when the degree of impatience is decreasing in consumption, ρc<0.  When ρc>0 
and the degree of impatience is sufficiently increasing in consumption, such a relationship is 
positive.  Therefore, different from existing studies with an exogenous time preference, there is 
possibly a Tobin effect in the TC model with an endogenous time preference.     
Following Wang and Yip (1992) and Zhang (2000), we now establish a qualitative 
equivalence between the MIUF and TC models.  It is clear that it is impossible for a higher 
growth rate of money to increase all capital, wealth, consumption and welfare.  Alternatively, if 
                                                 
14  The setup in Hayakawa (1995) is intrinsically to impose a cash-in-advance constraint on consumption.   
In a similar model with an exogenous time preference, Asako (1983) relaxed the limiting assumption by 
proposing a utility function that is separable in real balances and consumption in order to obtain the 
superneutrality. 
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we only focus on the effect on the reallocation of assets, it is possible to identify a set of 
conditions so the Tobin effect emerges in both models.  Indeed, a higher growth rate of money 
increases capital and wealth in both the MIUF and TC models when both conditions ρm>0 and 
ρc>0 hold and their magnitudes are sufficiently large.   In Wang and Yip (1992, Table 1, p. 555) 
and Zhang (2000, Table 2, p. 10), there are no unified parameter restrictions so the Tobin effect 
emerges in their MIUF and TC models.   
It is obvious there is a qualitative equivalence in terms of a reversed Tobin effect between 
the MIUF and TC models.  When both conditions ρm<0 and ρc<0 hold, a higher growth rate of 
money decreases capital, wealth, consumption and welfare in both the MIUF and TC models.  In 
Wang and Yip (1992, Table 1), a dominant consumption effect over a real balance effect is 
required in order to establish a qualitative equivalence in terms of a reversed Tobin effect between 
the MIUF and TC models.  A similar condition is also required to establish a qualitative 
equivalence in terms of a reversed Tobin effect between the different TC models in Zhang (2000, 
Table 2).  Moreover, labor-leisure tradeoffs are required in these two existing studies.  In our 
model, there is the requirement of neither a dominant consumption effect nor labor-leisure 
tradeoffs.  Rather, our equivalence result is established under endogenous time preferences.       
Finally, we should mention the plausibility of the conditions for a qualitative equivalence in 
terms of the relationship between inflation and growth where ρc>0 and ρm>0 for a positive 
relationship and ρc<0 and ρm<0 for a negative relationship.  In the former case, the required 
condition ρc>0 is consistent with Uzawa (1968), Lucas and Stokey (1984) and Obstfeld (1990).  
However, we find no existing evidence in support of the condition ρm>0.  Thus, a Tobin effect in 
our model is less plausible.  In the latter case, condition ρc<0 is consistent with that proposed by 
Fisher (1930), Koopmans (1960), Blanchard and Fischer (1989) and Barro and Sala-i-Martin 
(1995).  Moreover, condition ρm<0 is consistent with the evidence in Becker and Mulligan (1994).  
In view of a support in favor of ρm<0, it is more plausible that both the MIUF and TC models are 
qualitatively equivalent in terms of a negative relationship between inflation and growth in a 
steady state.   
 
5 Concluding  Remarks 
This paper revisits the issue of the relationship between inflation and growth in the long run.  
Different from the work by Brock (1974), Wang and Yip (1992) and Zhang (2000), we do not rely 
on a labor-leisure tradeoff in order to establish the non superneutrality of money.  We focus on the 
role of an endogenous time preference upon the demand for assets between real cash balances and 
capital in an optimal growth model between the MIUF and TC approaches.   Consideration of an   16
endogenous time preference influences the marginal rate of substitution between consumption 
now and in the future and thus changes capital accumulation.   As a result, we find a qualitative 
equivalence between the MIUF and TC models is easy to establish without relying on labor-
leisure tradeoffs and a dominant consumption effect.  Our results are in sharp contrast to those 
obtained in existing models with an exogenous time preference.         
In the MIUF model, we use an endogenous rate of time preference that depends not only on 
consumption flows but also on real balances.  In the TC model, we use an endogenous rate of 
time preference that depends only on consumption flows.  Both setups are consistent with 
endogenous time preference when applying the Volterra derivative.  Even in the absence of elastic 
labor, an endogenous time preference easily spreads the effect of real balances over to the optimal 
demand for capital and thus exerts an effect on capital in a steady state.      
In these two models, a higher inflation always leads to lower real balances.  However, the 
effect on capital and real assets depends on the degree of impatience in response to consumption 
and real balances.  Under increasing impatience in consumption, as proposed in Uzawa (1968) 
and others, and increasing impatience in real balances, we find higher capital and wealth in 
association with a higher inflation in both the MIUF and TC models.  As a result, the relationship 
between inflation and growth is positive in a steady state, as was argued in Tobin (1965).     
However, there is no evidence pointing to increasing impatience in real balances.  Alternatively, 
under decreasing impatience in both consumption and real balances, a higher inflation reduces 
capital and wealth in both the MIUF and TC models, thus a reverse Tobin effect.  Decreasing 
impatience in consumption is in line with Fisher (1930) and his followers, and decreasing 
impatience in real balances is also consistent with the evidence in Becker and Mulligan (1994).  
Therefore, in this plausible case the MIUF and TC models are qualitatively equivalent in terms of 
a negative relationship between inflation and growth in a steady state. 
Finally, we only consider a time preference affected by individual consumption and 
individual real balances in the current model.  Alternatively, time preferences may be affected by 
average (social) consumption and average real balances in an economy; thus there are admiration 
and zealousy effects (e.g., Meng, 2006).  Moreover, the subjective discount may be affected by 
either own past consumption (individual habits, e.g., Chen, 2006) or average past consumption 
(social habits, e.g., Alvarez-Cuadrado, et al 2004); thus there are the effects of catching up with 
the Joneses.  It may be interesting to see how consideration of different ways of formulating 
endogenous time preferences may affect the agent’s saving behavior and thus capital formation, 
an avenue for future research.    
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Appendix to “Inflation and Growth:  Impatience and a Qualitative Equivalence” 
 
Been-Lon Chen, Mei Hsu and Chia-Hui Lu 
 
Appendix 1  Conditions to Assure a Stable Saddle in the MIUF Model 
To assure a saddle stable steady state, if we take Taylor’s expansion of system (4d), (5b), 
(6a) and (6b) in the neighborhood of the steady state, we obtain  
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In the 4x4 dynamic equilibrium system, c, m and λ are all control variables whose initial 
values are not predetermined.  Their value can jump instantaneously.  The variable k is a state 
variable whose value is initially predetermined.  As a result, the unique steady state is a saddle if 
the number of eigenvalues with negative real parts is one.  This situation is possible only if the 
determinant of the Jacobean in (A1) is negative.  Denote as ∆ the determinant of the Jacobean.  
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Appendix 2 A  Cash-in-advance Constraint on Consumption 
The Hamiltonian function associated to the representative agent’s optimization program in 
an economy with the cash-in-advance constraint on consumption (c≤m) is 
(,, ,, , ,) {(, ) [ () ] ( ) ( ) (, ) } , Hckm Xucm fk c m a m k m c cm θ λϕξ θ π ν ξ ϕ λ ρ =+ − − + + − − + − − 
where ϕ  is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the cash-in-advance constraint.  
     Applying the maximum principle, the necessary conditions are 
(, ) (, ) , cc uc m c m θ λρ ϕ = −−                                                (A2a) 
    () , k fk θ ξ =                                                         (A2b) 
 (, ) (, ) , mm uc m c m θπϕ λ ρ ξ −+ + − =                                    (A2c) 
.
(, ) (, ) , ucm cm λλ ρ =− +                                                (A2d) 
(, ) , cm θ ρθ ξ = − &                                                   (A2e) 
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The steady-state conditions, with the binding cash-in-advance constraint, are 
m
*=c
*,                                                          (A3a) 
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Apparently, with a binding cash-in-advance constraint in (A3a), the CC condition (A3b) 
and the KR rule (A3c) can determine c
* and k
* in a steady state without relying on other steady-
state conditions.  Once consumption is determined by (A3b) and (A3c), the real shadow price of 
the cumulative discount, λ
*, is determined by (A3d) independent of other variables.  As a result, 
the economy is dichotomized in the fashion as if ρm=0.  Thus, when the growth rate of nominal 
money supply increases, it affects the shadow price of the cash constraint, 
*, ϕ  of capital, θ
*, and 
of the assets, ξ
*, through (A3e)-(A3g).  As a result, the growth rate of nominal money supply only 
affects the prices, without exerting any effects on capital, consumption and real balances.   Indeed,   21
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Appendix 3  Derivation of (8b) 
  Differentiating (7d), together (7b), yields 
22
22
{[ ] ( ) [ ] }




kk mc mc m cc cc c d
uu uu dm







θ ρ λρ ρ ρ ρ µ λρ ρ
λρ ρ ρ µ λρ ρ θ
−−
−−
−− − + + − − =
−− + + −− −
           (A4) 




− =  and  2 () .
mm uu ρρθ
ρ ρ µ ρ
− =+  
  Thus, (A4) becomes 
{[ ( ) ( ) ( ) ] [ ( ) ] }
{ [ () ( ) ( ) ] [() ] () } ,
dk
kk cc cc mc mc m c d
dm







ρρ µ λ ρ λ ρ ρ ρ µ ρ
ρ µλ ρ λ ρ ρ ρ µ ρ ρ µ θ
++ − − − + − + +
+− − −+ − + += −
   
which is rewritten as 
     
() ( ) ( ) ()
() ( ) ( ) ()
{}
{( ) } 1 ,
cc cc mc mc m c






ρ µ λρ λρ ρ ρ µ ρ θθ
ρθρ θ µ




+− − − − +




and finally, as 
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Appendix 4  Welfare in the MIUF Model in a Steady State 
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Differentiating (A6) with respect to c
*, m
* and µ yields 
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Substituting (9a)-(9c) and using (7d), we rewrite the above expression as  
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Appendix 5  Optimization and Equilibrium Conditions in the TC Model  
The Hamiltonian associated to the representative agent’s optimization program is  
(,, ,, ,) {() [ () (, ) ] () ( ) } . Hckm Xuc fk c m Tcm c a m k θ λξ θ π ν λ ρ ξ =+− − + −− + − −  
Applying the maximum principle, the necessary conditions are 
                                               ( ) ( ) ( , ), ccc uc c Tc m θ λρ θ =− −                                              (A8a)                                 
() k fk θ ξ = ,                                                            (A8b)                                 
(, ) , m Tc m θπξ θ + =−                                                    (A8c) 
                                                            
.
() () , uc c λλ ρ =− +                                                      (A8d) 
                                                              ( ) , c θ ρθ ξ = − &                                                          (A8e) 








= .     
All the above optimal conditions are similar to those in (4a-4e) in the MIUF model, except 
that the marginal utility of consumption in (A8a) is net of transaction costs, and the marginal 
utility of real balances in (A8c) includes the facilitation of transactions.     
The equilibrium is constituted by (A8a-e), (5a) and (12) that determines {c, m, k, λ, θ, ξ, π}.  
To simplify the equilibrium conditions, (5a) and (A8a-c) lead to 
        ( ) . km mf T m µ =++ &                                                       (A9a) 
Moreover, differentiating (A8a) and using (A8b) yields 
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  Thus, (A8d), (12) and (A9a-b) constitute a simplified 4x4 dynamic equilibrium system.  
These four equations solve {c, m, k, λ}, and the other three variables are determined by using 
(A8a), (A8c) and (A8e). 
If we take a linear Taylor expansion of dynamic system (A8d), (12) and (A9a-b) around the 
unique steady state {c*, k*, m*, λ*}, we obtain the following: 
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where  
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In the dynamic system, only capital is initially predetermined.  As a result, to ensure a 
stable saddle in a steady state, it is required that the determinant is negative, denoted by ∆TC<0.  
 
Appendix 6  Welfare in the TC Model in a Steady State 
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Differentiating (A11) with respect to c
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Table 1.  Comparative-static results of a higher growth rate of money  
   m K a   C U 
MIUF  ρm > 0  －  ＋  ＋
a  ＋  ＋
b 
  ρm < 0  －  －  －  －  － 











a  ρm> ρρc−fkk>0, 
b  ρm> (1+µ/ρ)(ρρc-fkk) >0, 
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